



libra advisory group 

ENDING INTERNAL CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO STABILISATION AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

**Monday 19 – Thursday 22 July 2010
1041th WILTON PARK CONFERENCE**

TRANSCRIPT FROM NETBOOKS

Participants were invited to provide additional inputs to the discussion through a system of wirelessly connected netbooks called the TEAMWIN COLLABORATOR. The aim was to capture verbatim all questions and comments as they arose in order to progress the discussion over the ensuing days and aid in producing the conference report.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. Expectations 1

SESSION 1: SETTING THE SCENE FOR KEY THEMES

2. Comparing developing country approaches to internal conflict, COIN, and peacebuilding 2
3. Reconciliation and reintegration: lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan 3
4. Security force assistance: challenges and the road ahead 4
5. Plenary discussion 5

SESSION 2: SEARCH FOR KEY THEMES

6. Development 6
7. Structure 6
8. Political 7
9. Roles 7
10. Use of force 8

SESSIONS 3-6: CASE STUDIES

11. Colombia 9
12. Pakistan 11
13. Philippines 14
14. Nigeria 15

SESSION 7: LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES

15. Capacity gaps 17
16. Key cross-cutting issues 17
17. Review of key themes and ideas for break out group discussion 18

SESSIONS 8-12: THEMATIC ISSUES

18. Summary 24
19. Group 1: Approaches to operational coordination 28
20. Group 2: Building balanced security and justice systems 30
21. Group 3: Approaches to reconciliation 36

EXPECTATIONS

Fast forward to 6.30pm Wed ... what are YOU celebrating?

Sharing, meeting, learning

- Comparative experiences better understood
- Continuous learning process
- Cross-sharing of ideas across various disciplines
- Different perspectives
- Engaging and understanding others
- Having had plenty of interesting conversations
- Hearing from key protagonists
- Increased understanding of alternative approaches to post-conflict programming
- It was great to network with peers working in the same area
- Learn from other countries' ideas or methods to deal with countries emerging from conflicts
- Learn from others
- Learn other participants' experience in stabilization and COIN in violent conflict situations
- Listen to and understand different perspectives
- Meet people working in other contexts
- New friends
- Renew intellectual capital and gain some insight into issues from different perspectives
- Shared experience with people from other countries
- Shared ideas on international best practices on stabilization and their applicability in specific contexts
- Understand others' views on the subject

Knowledge/insights

- Deeper knowledge of the four case studies
- Innovative ways of addressing instability in countries
- Insights into effective post-conflict stabilisation for practitioners
- Insights into post-conflict stabilisation
- Insights on how to approach issues of stabilisation, justice and prospects for democracy building in cases where the lines between insurgencies and transnational organized crime are very blurred
- New ideas for conflict prevention
- See some greater rationality in counterinsurgency strategies

Practical application/thinking

- Bring real issues into the limelight and facilitate a shared understanding
- Concrete proposals for ways of implementing our policy aims
- Developing a strategy for dealing with counterinsurgency and the process for peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Practical input to policy on engaging local actors
- Some useful comparative experiences to inform next steps in Afghanistan...

Operational coordination

- Development of effective joint inter-agency strategy
- Diagnose the extent of international optimism about the feasibility of stabilization operations and the real value added of the "comprehensive approach"
- Getting development on the stabilisation agenda

Host government engagement

- Understand in more detail the importance of building effective host government institutions to develop priorities, engage effective technical assistance, and then deliver
- Ways of making local ownership real

Other

- English bitters; weather; free name tag; survival; great gathering for peace in a lovely setting

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS SESSION 1

COMPARING DEVELOPING COUNTRY APPROACHES TO INTERNAL CONFLICT, COIN, AND PEACEBUILDING

Ajai SAHNI

- Insurgency takes root because of the failure of the state institutions to come up to the expectations of the locals of the specific region?
- How important is the ordinary citizen?
- How RAPIDLY make an assessment of root causes AND the new dynamic? How to restructure quickly when faced with initially small scale insurgency?
- Does it take insurgency to receive development from a government that has ignored the root cause?
- If the social space in the conflict/troubled zone has been denied to external dynamics i.e. root causes addressed, how can insurgency continue?
- Is legitimacy then just a function of the most powerful?
- What if both sides have a crystallization of will and are relatively equally resourced (small unit to small unit)?
- How do you create such a surgical division?
- How does the sponsorship of insurgents by neighbouring states alter the chances of insurgent success?
- In an era of sexed up intelligence to suit political leadership how far can you rely on intelligence where government has a partisan interest?
- R2 - Event driven requires a balanced response based on focused FIND and EXPLOIT followed by very precision strike
- Reconciling our strategic objectives with our capacities - experimentation in protracted wars - definitely need the longer-term outlook you describe
- Spectrum of use of force is determined by international humanitarian law not just by decision of the state
- How can the state retain the option of reconciliation open to the insurgent while undertaking COIN ops?
- What is the role of local leaders in a decentralized COIN approach?
- Do insurgencies do better in a state when local government is ineffective, corrupt, and unrepresentative? Is there any evidence that this is the case?

Safaa Rasul HUSSAIN

- Militant groups arise from the public ... How can you realistically separate them?
- Use an Insurgent to defeat an Insurgency
- Asymmetric Threats are best defeated by a Symmetric Response
- Is the object of the military force to be the insurgents' military capability or the will and resolve of not just those who support it but also the population in which it lives?
- How is legitimacy of expeditionary forces gained against local insurgent groups?
- How justify negotiations to your own people and your own military?
- Isn't blanket refusal to talk to insurgency elements counter-productive? I thought the best strategy is to disaggregate the movement with a view to finding elements that are amenable to being used to deal with hardliners?
- Battle of the Narrative not well understood but critical to reach a successful outcome
- Was there at any stage in Iraq an "insurgency" in the real sense?
- With the media influencing public opinion so much, what are the implications (and are there many examples) of a country's press supporting insurgents over a legitimate government?
- How have the states managed to win the media support in successful COIN campaigns?

- Elements within the media have supported most significant insurgencies. This may include sympathetic elements, or 'useful idiots' who end up serving insurgent interests from disparate ideological backgrounds, particularly including the peace and human rights lobby.
- Iraqi people are tired of war but insurgents have crystallized political will. The people may not want to fight but the insurgents will, even if fragmented. How do you combat this?
- State propaganda and efforts to manipulate the media usually fail. However, an information based strategy, which actually shares data and hard facts with the media can prove quite successful.
- Tacit popular support for insurgents is often derived from the role they play in providing services to the population, such as food, shelter, education, access to justice etc., that the government is unable, or in some cases unwilling, to provide. Surely capacity building/development has a role to play in countering insurgency in building the capacity of governments all levels to deliver essential services.
- Role of international humanitarian organisations has often remained debatable?

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION: LESSONS FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Lt GEN Sir Graeme C.M. LAMB

- Your own politicians and public aren't as open-minded as you are
- Need to not forget that "they" normally is not monolithic
- The best way to understand anyone is to talk to them on their own terms, understand the language, the customs, the relationships and local expectations and aspirations
- How do we get the decision makers to understand the realities of life in the field, the limits of action at the local level, the determination of 'insurgents' and their opaque supporters?
- You don't choose when you pull-out, it's determined by your electoral cycle.
- What if we do not understand who the government actually is? In the centre or at the provincial and local level?
- What price support to an emerging regime that is illegitimate? Non-representative and unpopular; should the people just aspire to peace at any price?
- The development component of COIN and post conflict consolidation is the ability to deliver services to the population. Local governments or local leadership are key to delivering those services even in the most centralized regimes. You, therefore, need to understand the context of local government operation and then move to strengthen the capacity of local governments to deliver services, overcoming the reasons why services have not been delivered, derived from that prior understanding of the context.
- So R2 is just involving the insurgent in planning the country's future?
- If planning is everything, maybe it's nothing - topic of a famous planning paper, but highly relevant to those who think that one can plan and project manage your way out of anything
- How can you have an Afghan solution with so much of presence of foreign troops?
- When their way of doing things is too far from our way of doing things, is that the time for us to leave, even if we have to sell out on our basic principles (right to life etc.)?
- Afghans are known to have always quarrelled among themselves and then sat down and found an acceptable solution to all parties?
- Here we have the concept of 'good enough'. Who says what is good enough? A good enough settlement, good enough governance, good enough reconciliation and reintegration etc etc
- What if they won't talk to you? What if they lie to you?
- How do you show them a hope of a better life in reconciliation?

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: CHALLENGES AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Garry REID

- You can build local security forces but it is another matter to build local effective government
- Partnership delivers a double (exponential) return on the investment
- How long does it take to actually develop effective language and cultural knowledge? Especially if you end up in multiple theaters in short periods of time?
- We talk about governance - but the International Community does not agree what governance actually means, how it should be developed/nurtured, and indeed what is the agreed vision for the sort of government we are somehow building.
- Is AQ capable of organising militant insurgencies anywhere in the world or essentially limited to Muslim regions?
- How exactly do representative governments balance a military/defense view that these are long and protracted fights vice a polity and government that demands short timelines?
- Why is it that we talk of a 80-20 ratio of the role of political and military effort for a lasting solution to insurgencies, but the world remains predominantly focused on the military means?
- It is relatively easy to find and kill someone; it is exceedingly difficult to kill a Movement or an Idea - AQ is both
- Our definitions of governance are not important--what is important is how a country defines governance--i.e. what powers and resources are given to local governments; how can those powers and resources be used in the most effective fashion to deliver services desired by communities using approaches that accord with the country's political and cultural context.
- Movements are principally carried forward by small groups of individuals employing closely targeted methods of organisational recruitment. You cannot destroy an idea by attacking the foot soldiers, most of whom have an extremely rudimentary idea of what they are fighting for. However, if you can successfully target the core leaderships, not just the movement, but the idea itself, degrades rapidly.
- Maybe the military is the wrong tool if the legislative infrastructure doesn't support its use
- Governance in one way is the credibility of the state among the populace? If not the people start looking towards other centres of powers for their problems
- Surely there is a huge risk that targeting and removing core leadership will create a sense of martyrdom and cause the movement to increase in both passion and momentum (and perhaps justification depending on circumstance)?
- How do you apply centralized or sophisticated military forces in a decentralized or diffuse indigenous population that just sees you as invasive?
- What if you cannot even get agreement on local government legislation and application - decentralisation of powers and resources, responsibilities, local civil representation etc? Such as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan
- What risk analysis has been carried out regarding arming local militias in Afghanistan?
- Fragile states that have both a military and a police force need to have clearly defined and distinct roles for the two organisations and a strong civil administration to manage them. Using military forces to train civil police forces in fragile states is a significant issue. In a country like Afghanistan, where the police are considered to be more predatory and ruthless than the Taliban, using military personnel (including Special Forces) to train Afghan Police is creating a mercenary force that is undermining the legitimacy of both the Afghan government and the international community. Police need to be trained in civil policing by police forces and in the first instance should focus on delivering law and order to the population and not high end policing such as counter-terrorism. The international community needs to invest in building police capacities that can deploy overseas and support this initiative.
- Regarding TSCTP in Africa, how do you proceed where central governments fail or are under serious siege? Why should our number one concern be theirs?
- How is training Afghan National Police using a curriculum of only 10% policing versus 90% security skills sustainable?
- Efforts tend to focus on military capability, yet the Indian examples, and many others besides, have been police-led. Why the focus on the military when police capabilities and capacities are equally, if not more, important?

PLENARY DISCUSSION

- Q for Reid: What timeframe do we envisage for the Afghan army to be capable of taking over the requirement of provision of security independently? Is there confusion in Washington? [Response: refer to Obama WestPoint speech - 18 month initial period to resource the strategy; then formal assessment]
- Who defines criminal groups? Is this a way to criminalise an anti-government movement?
- Session had too much emphasis on Western approaches/experience
- Please share Plan B [on international assistance to Afghanistan]
- Part of Plan might be much more modest end-states for ANSF - "good enough"... But is this feasible?
- Do we need to split things into two? i.e. the host government approach (India, Sri Lanka) as opposed to the multinational forces 'western model' approach (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia etc). What can we learn from this?
- Insurgencies have been countered successfully when those countering it have (a) had a long-term objective which was 'reasonably' attainable, (b) resources were applied, (c) they stuck it out, (d) they adapted the ways and means as the situation developed
- Can anyone "empower" anyone else? Rather, don't people choose (or not) to empower themselves?
- Empowered can be both given and taken - the seam between the two is where the hard work takes place at the National and Local Levels and both are different
- When you put the partners "in front", what does that mean? In front to take the enemies worst, or "in front" to define priorities, direct approach etc? What does it look like to the citizens of Iraq or Afghanistan?
- Surprisingly the affected party ('Afghans') are not represented; their side of the story's missing
- How do you define "good enough"? Good enough to be able to operate competently as a professional force in their own environment, or good enough by western standards? I would suggest the former
- "Good enough" is a low bar and needs to be held there, not allowing for expectation creep, otherwise it costs in time and treasury
- We are talking a lot about COIN, but very little mention of stabilising the peace and peacebuilding. These are key counterparts to COIN, surely?
- Are we kidding ourselves about putting military 'advisers' in foreign civilian ministries? Even highly experienced consultants with advanced 'process' skills and technical knowledge are stretched in a conflict-affected or fragile situation. If the mission is 'capacity building', is there any real understanding of the current debate on the serious deficiencies in CB?
- Soldiers training other soldiers is an understood requirement and likely task; but how, and indeed should, soldiers be trained to train host nation police forces? If not soldiers training police, who trains the police?
- Who is policing the police?
- Training police and military forces is down to capacity; the military has had to stand in to train police forces due to lack of own police capacity. It also depends on what type of police force. Military forces can train a paramilitary police force but must have police mentors to teach the legal framework
- The problem of non-military advisers in a difficult and dangerous conflict is separate departments' individual duty of care restrictions - if you cannot go there you cannot really influence outcomes
- What is the "end state" for which the US strategy is being reviewed?
- Problem of defining "victory" from a whole-of-government perspective
- Problem of defining "success" from the host nation's perspective
- Many countries, like Australia, have built policing capabilities where officials can both undertake policing duties overseas and train, mentor and build the capacity of police forces in other countries. In short it is the police who should be training the police. However, this must be done in conjunction with the development of a robust civil administration and justice sector that meet the needs of the government and the population
- Some definitional issues need clarity - how to differentiate between insurgency and legitimate resistance, between insurgency and freedom fight
- Right of self-determination is the criterion to differentiate between insurgency and legitimate resistance

SEARCH FOR KEY THEMES SESSION 2

DEVELOPMENT

Does Development work?

- Question is rather "who" is doing the development? Issue of local legitimacy
- If we consider that development alone will provide us sustainable stability we are sadly mistaken. However, if we ignore development at all then your presence in the area is further challenged
- Does development work is too broad an issue. Progress can be made towards the Millennium Development Goals without progress on conflict reduction. The issue is how can development reduce conflict and promote peace
- Afghan proverb - "do not plant a tree in another man's garden". Development itself is not wrong (or at least hardly ever) - it is how you do it
- Development, especially in terms of education and economic opportunities, always works - in the long term
- Development is a key issue in order to share peace dividends with the local population and avoid insurgency. For this, local population has to participate in the construction of its own future and realize insurgency is not worthy
- Safety cannot be achieved without development. And development can only be sustainable with security
- Could it be less development per se than the distribution or dynamics of development that influence - reduce or decrease - conflict? It might be interesting to investigate why some of the richest areas in Afghanistan are among the most insecure while some of the poorest are among the most secure
- Does "development" work? Yes, in some cases. No, in some cases. Doesn't matter, in some cases. The fault is theorizing and trying to find a general rule. Every insurgency is unique, complex and fluid. The key is to find the factors when it worked, when it didn't, and when it didn't matter. In fact, labelling a situation as an "insurgency" does not help
- What development are we talking about? Is it the type defined by the west and imposed on local communities?
- Is it the type that is deliberately targeting causes of insurgency?
- If development is unimportant why do insurgents compete for governance using development too; populations demand self-interested benefits from either just or unjust governance

STRUCTURE

How to structure COIN?

- Complex problems (crises) perpetually change, our structures must be adaptive, not fixed (a form of: plans are worthless, but planning is everything)
- Criminals and their organisations are reconcilable if the alternative is catastrophic failure
- It is bigger than networks; what is emerging are assemblies of like-minded but unconnected trans-national groups and individuals - there are no linkages which makes intelligence exploitation extremely difficult
- Graeme raised the point that whilst we collect lessons we seldom learn them or change the way we do business because of them. Insurgent groups on the other hand tend to be learning organisations and are often far more flexible, adaptive and imaginative than large bureaucracies. Improving the capacity of government institutions to learn and adapt is crucial in addressing the multi-dimensional conflicts we will continue to face into the future
- The structure for COIN needs to be as multi-dimensional as the insurgency itself is... involving both security and development sectors
- The military is too powerful - the staff support overwhelms other Government Departments who go silent when they should not

- Are the traditional silos in the west viewing Afghanistan and Iraq as unique and never going to recur? Are they are expecting to return to "normality" without there being any such future engagement which creates the burning platform to challenge the siloed approach?

POLITICAL

How do we deal with our own side's political pressures?

- "If you plan for it to be short, it will be long"
- The legitimacy and representative nature of the government is as important as the legitimacy of the military intervention
- Managing expectations is downstream; where the challenge lies is in visualising the expectation (worst, probable and best case) before the decision is made to commit to a coalition or deployment - the reasons and modelling that did not take place before the decision to Nation Build Afghanistan was taken are a good example of lazy political decision-making
- Dealing with our domestic political pressures is complicated because every message can reach many, diverse, even opposed audiences: how do we create and deliver "precision-guided messages"?

ROLES

International involvement: What is the division of labour?

- We're not structured to get police advisors on the ground, let alone justice advisors - even though we know we need more civilian inputs
- Duty of care - civilians prevented from participating in the same ways as military personnel
- The problem with using the military outside its role is not that they don't like it, the problems are that (1) it steals both opportunity and ownership from the local government and citizens and (2) the tool we use is not fit-for-purpose, and so is usually much less effective
- If local knowledge is key to understanding insurgency, criminal activities and legitimate local grievances, how can we fairly ask the military to address and resolve these issues in affected areas? How can you keep local actors safe?
- Bearing in mind the importance of UN missions (Sudan!), is a major consideration the building of appropriate doctrine, approach, capacity of the UN? Internal evaluation by the UN itself has admitted they just keep getting it wrong. In some countries do we just ignore them?
- Security and Defence are becoming indivisible but progress in this 21st Century problem is held apart by the very Institutions of State who deliver these services the upcoming SDR will fail to address this
- UN missions need adequately staffed Public Information and Civil Affairs units. And these units have to work in a two-way street. They have to listen to the local population as well. Understanding local necessities and expectations helps a successful mission
- If development works, why is Haiti a failure? Many countries have tried a variety of approaches, with Haitian support, yet despite hundreds of millions of dollars and best intentions, decades of approaches, we haven't found an answer, even accounting for corruption and political will. Should we retreat from the field?
- Haiti is not a failure. It had been a success case before the earthquake. It is an example of development used wisely to help Haitians to build their own country. However, the quake showed that the international community was not ready to respond as fast as we thought
- To the extent possible, the international donors need to get local regional blocs, organisations, and regional countries involved in the process. This will help in bridging the gap between Western concepts of governance which the donors are trying to implement, and local governance structures that are deeply rooted within the system
- The extraordinary variation in the quality of personnel who work in conflict-affected and fragile states overwhelms our counterparts and reduces their confidence and ability to identify what is useful advice, and what is useless, and a waste of money and time

- Who sets priorities? Who really decides what gets done first? What is the process? Are there any examples in the world where the international force is in harmony with the host government on how to deal with the insurgency, the amount of force, the required supporting and facilitating actions, the "end state"? Or are priorities in the 'western' approach doomed to failure as they are rooted in alien priorities?
- It important to unify understanding of mission. Development is defined differently by various agencies, as is engagement practices and capacities
- What about the "stooge factor"? Do we need to suspend our egos and contribute sufficiently to a corrupt society we know is victimizing us to see some scintilla of progress? What does our message become?
- If development were unimportant then insurgents wouldn't compete for governance and development
- Many countries are building their capacity to deploy civilian experts overseas, as part of a whole-of-government strategy, to address complex emergencies. Why? Development experts have a greater understanding of how to deliver best practice development initiatives that may actually work, police personnel have a much greater capacity to train police forces in civil policing, civil service officers will be more effective in building effective governance mechanisms. What should the focus of the military be? Delivering security and creating space for civilian experts to come in and deliver that expertise in support of the affected host nation. It is worth noting that government civilians are often prepared to accept a greater level of security risk than military personnel give them credit for, and that when we talk about timelines in places like Afghanistan, we are only talking about the timelines for the withdrawal of military forces. Civilians - government and non-government - are there for the long term

USE OF FORCE

- I think patterns of use of force and efficacy of use of force should also be a key theme.
- The West has developed rules of thumb about the mass of security forces compared to the local population required to protect a population and combat an insurgency. Does the experience of counter-insurgencies where the international community has played a minor role affirm these estimates or challenge them?
- Private Security Companies (PSCs) are part of the future or are they? - I believe they are
- US Forces in Afghanistan are considering changing the RoE (air strikes) - positive step. Although this kind of calibrated approach will take time
- Importance of understanding the appropriate use of force and the complimentary development of human security, food security, suitable locally supported government structures appropriate to the culture, customs, local economy - even if we don't empathise with the latter
- Two points: On Haiti, the earthquake response effort was far from a failure. It was the largest and most successful international search and rescue effort in history saving 136 lives and the largest urban feeding program ever feeding more than 3 million people in record time, which avoided serious conflict. Unfortunately the media focused more on the real horror of the earthquake rather than the successes. Second point is on roles. It is critical that civilian institutions are given the resources to lead or the military will continue to be forced to play a de facto leadership role when it's development and diplomacy that needs to lead

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS

SESSION 3

COLOMBIA

- This idea that rarely is there a unified enemy is a good one. Often in many contemporary examples many leaders (military and political) frame the issue as "THE" insurgency which is often not a good example of reality. This is as true of Iraq from 2004, in Colombia and with the Taliban today
- Grouping all militant groups in Afghanistan under 'Taliban' umbrella is the doing of the Coalition. Even Taliban (local Afghans) have to be also separated from the Al Qaida and other Foreign fighters
- Also applies to Al Shabaab in Somalia
- Guerrillas isolated from the people are like fish out of water. In troubled areas therefore the contest between the two adversaries (state vs insurgent) is to secure maximum social space. So the COIN operations need to be more focussed on denying this critical space to the insurgent and enhancing the credibility of the state amongst the people
- Has "democratic security" also been equally applied to extreme right armed groups, who seem to have had a significant impact in the recomposition of local and regional politics as well as in undermining rule of law, access to justice, etc?
- How were the capacity gaps in governance and the security apparatus overcome in Colombia?
- Some great lessons. However, is the success achieved in Colombia only possible in a country that has a strong national identity and an understanding of centralised state systems? In a country like Afghanistan, and others, where there is no concept of national identity how do we generate nationwide cultural change?
- Nation building and state building are two different things. Historical cases indicate both are important (but perhaps not determinate) to overall economic development.
- How are citizen priorities identified at the outset when an area is being 'cleared' - how does the Government avoid the benefits of programmes being captured by local elites whose behaviour may have been a cause of support for the insurgents in the first place?
- One of the greatest challenges facing countries trying to "hold" cleared areas is finding civil servants willing to work in such hostile areas. What steps did the Colombian Government take to attract such staff?
- Did the USAID work/coordinate with the insurgents to ensure that their programs are effective? How closely did they coordinate?
- How did the government coordinate various international players/donors to ensure that these donors do not drive their individual agenda and instead, support the government's agenda? Was there an institution that evaluated, consolidated and evaluated various programs/aid?
- The success of Plan Colombia was largely personality based from President Uribe on down in the GOC and among interagency stakeholders and the Country Team in the US. How can these lessons learned be internalized and institutionalized in the USG and exported by the GoC to other countries facing an insurgent threat?
- Colombia is a sophisticated society, a successful government with a 200 year history. Can these lessons be applied to less sophisticated collections of tribal communities, fledgling states?
- The insurgency ends when the military capabilities of insurgents have been neutralised. What remains may be grievances, causes, root causes, political problems or whatever we may choose to call these. Whether or not another insurgency surfaces at a later stage is, however, irrelevant to the question whether the current insurgency has ended. Political sagacity in the redressal of grievances is, however, imperative in the post-insurgency phase if future violence has to be prevented
- The distinction between metrics and 'metricization' that Sergio mentioned is crucial. Metrics will always be important in evaluating the success or failure of a campaign, but a mechanical application of a particular metric can often become a problem. An obsession with body counts is the most obvious example here, and this has resulted in both failures of strategic assessment and operational distortions, such as progressively indiscriminate operations by the forces, or worse, the faking of 'insurgent' fatalities

- When we say that homicides reduced in Colombia, did it include killings carried out by government forces
- The Colombian drug lords are transferring their operations to the gulf of guinea in Africa and using it to move their goods to Europe

What has worked well in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- How did the different agencies share the intelligence? Was it ad hoc (through personal networks), or institutionalised?
- "Democratic security" - every citizen has a claim to be safe. Clear concepts >> clear direction
- "Consolidation policy", including HR considerations - more depth to concept of security
- Use of structured incentives, targeting top leadership, to "change their life" - offering to make them legal which is important in Colombia. Had strong legal framework, humanitarian support package, reintegration programme, sophisticated comms campaign (at theatre level, to national level through TV). 14,000 FARC demobilised; logic of tension created within opposing camp; changing perceptions of what national troops are doing, and what they really think about the aims of their group
- It is very important to demobilize armed groups, whoever they are, and this seems to be working well in Colombia with the FARC. But what happens AFTER that? How are these people being re-inserted? How does the population receive them?
- Please tell us how you got your sequencing right !!! An old chestnut.. i.e. dev-security
- What was the balance of Colombian investment in the COIN/Counter-Narcotic campaign between the military and complementary civilian activities? With hindsight was this balance right?

INTERNATIONAL

- The role of the international actor has been seen as benevolent in Colombia - which I guess contributed to the success of the engagement. This has not been the case in majority of states where international donors intervene and engage
- Separating the population from the insurgents - a very key element, but the most challenging aspect in counter insurgency. Sadly most COIN operations being heavily tilted towards use of force, overlook how to break the support base of the insurgents and regain the state's legitimacy and sovereignty in the area.
- Another lesson to be taken away from the Colombian experience appears to be sustainability - of political partnership, external presence, and financial sustainability. This is very hard to come about in most conflict situations.
- Choose the right metrics and restrain from over-generalizing.
- Support leadership of host government and strongly resist the donor/international urge to usurp the lead.
- What were the alternative livelihood strategies put in place to stabilize and sustain the drugs eradication campaign in Columbia?
- It is easier to isolate insurgents from small populations in isolated areas than urban environments. How do you do this in urban insurgencies?

What could have been done better in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- The two examples of the distorting use of metrics are well taken. Similar lessons are being learnt by the international community in Afghanistan where greater emphasis is now given to measures of security experienced by the population and perceptions of legitimacy of the host nation state. Did the Government of Colombia use these and if so were these less distorting?

INTERNATIONAL

- National and international coordination did definitely help in addressing the problem in Colombia. But what about the effect that success has had on the region? For instance, the issue of drug trafficking and the problem related to it has been controlled in Colombia, but has surfaced and now established in other regional countries, namely Mexico and Jamaica. Basically, the result of the balloon effect. Lesson for the international community is to look beyond the country for such negative fallouts in neighbouring countries that have no institutional capacity to handle the new situation
- Defeat of FARC has led to new insurgency/transnational crime in Ecuador and Panama, to safe havens in Venezuela. Did you just chase the problem away - for a while...?
- Insurgency is generally an internal problem and FARC is in fact being defeated by the Colombian Government. The drug economy however is still there. That's why drug-trafficking is now being exported to Peru and Ecuador. It is not the insurgency that is being exported, but drug production. It's a completely different discussion
- Is there a possibility of FARC transforming and coming into popular politics after the military defeat or damage...like their friends in Northern Ireland...?
- To what extent the internal administrative division of Colombia (unitary) helped in the process?
- It is relevant to consider the international supply-demand for DRUGS and GUNS/ammunitions. When dealing with insurgencies that manipulate or profit from drugs, how to deal with the international market/demand for it, and with the enormous supply/availability of weapons and ammunitions?

PAKISTAN

- Rigid distinctions between insurgency and terrorism no longer apply. All contemporary terrorist groups have a significant insurgent base. Conversely, all major insurgencies employ terrorist methods - although in different degrees. Campaigns of response, consequently, have to combine both counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency elements.
- Ideologically dealing with Islamic fundamentalism is key to COIN with Al Qaeda types.. Is there anything done in this regard or is it all "military" options taken...?
- How do you deter an insurgency?
- In the "3D" approach, how did you determine the "development" assistance/stage? Was it Army conducting development activities, or was there cooperation with traditional non-state development actors, including intl and local NGOs?
- In the 2009 operations in SWAT, according to Pakistan Army sources, a total of 1800 'Taliban' were killed. However, nearly 3.5 million people were displaced by indiscriminate bombing operations.
- Are you saying there is no longer insurgency in SWAT?
- What did you learn about working with the police counterparts?
- How did the Special Support Group relate to the Apex committee forum during the battle effort?
- What efforts would you point to that might inhibit future insurgency re-emergence in this area?
- How exactly do you define government control? What are the characteristics that decide whether land is contested or not?
- The first presentation has focused on military action and previous failed efforts at political dialogue. What measures are being taken to address the underlying political and economic grievances?
- Can you speak to the belief that Pakistan's policy partly encourages and endorses the existence of irregular forces (including elements of the Taliban) - which may be counter-productive to long term stability for Pakistan itself?
- Setting aside their obvious cultural challenge in operating amongst the people during intervention operations, Western forces have found significant challenges in training forces to operate against insurgents. What lessons for training have the Pakistani Army and Police Forces identified that could be applied by her allies?
- Role of ISI?
- What is influence of regional countries and extreme ideology on the insurgency in Pakistan?

- How exactly do you propose to de-radicalize the portion of the population that more radical elements of the Taliban and others are currently infecting?
- Why can't we call the tribal regions "conflict-affected"?
- The army used artillery and airpower in its CI ops in Swat. Can these be reconciled with the kind of 'people centric' security strategies that are formally acknowledged as 'desirable'. Especially since Gen. Aslam concedes that Pakistani Forces do not have the technological and intelligence capabilities to mount surgical strikes?
- 2.5 million people did not 'move out' and 'move back' in any ordered fashion. This was a deeply distressful migration in both directions, and many came back to homes that had often been looted or destroyed. During the campaigns, entire villages and townships were laid flat by artillery and air attacks.
- FATA has historically been problematic for Pakistan, and not only due to external interferences/influences. It is unclear the extent to which Pakistan is "serious" about ongoing instability (cf Colombia example). 3% literacy rates in the FATA - this is lower than Afghanistan. How is this, and other social inequalities being addressed alongside the military strategy?
- Special Police - is there a strategy for their "reintegration" back into the community once they are no longer needed to perform those roles?
- Special Force - Do they undergo human rights training?
- Special police - how vetted, how accountable, reintegration - into police, F Constabulary, civilian life. What has been planned?
- How is the loyalty of the Special Force to government assured? Experience elsewhere suggests that they can themselves become destabilising
- What measures has the government undertaken to ensure a professional armed force?
- Any thoughts on an approach to developing policing in Afghanistan?
- What would this dedicated "counter-insurgency" force look like? Civilian, military, intelligence?
- How do you reconcile the need to contain or win the campaign against terrorism with Liam Fox's view that we cannot be the world's policeman?
- What development projects do the Special Force undertake?
- The parallels between Pakistan in 2010 and Colombia in 2000 are striking. Has there been a dialogue between the governments and civil society between the two countries? Could a dialogue be started? What lessons from Colombia are relevant to Pakistan?
- What development support from the international community (i.e. US, China) is given to help Pakistan in its COIN?
- What capability-building training had been undertaken for those involved in deradicalization programs?
- There has been no mention of the ISI. What is the current utility and view of that organisation and complicity with the Taliban?
- What do you think about the "Post-Crisis Needs Assessment" (PCNA) for FATA/KP? What can such a process help achieve/progress? Once agreed, how could it be followed through?
- DNA - even if the money was there, could you spend it? Does GoP have the capacity? How capable is the FATA Secretariat, and other coordinating bodies? Is the issue really money, or allocation of funding?
- How does your difficulty with lack of funds gel with stories of large unspent amounts of assistance?
- If you encourage and allow the people to leave, then what stops the insurgents from leaving with them and coming back with them later?
- I'm interested in the lessons learning process among COIN actors in KPK/FATA. What do you do better now and why and how is this communicated as doctrine/policy/procedures? e.g. command and control of COIN ops - what are the optimum respective roles of the army, police, FC, F Constabulary, int community, federal and provincial govts? What are the criteria for declaring an area under effective government control? How is effective government control now exercised in FATA (traditionally it was via the nexus between the federally-appointed Political Agent and the maliks)
- What is role of USG in lessons process?
- How has the Pakistani insurgencies and govt response affected the environment and quality of thinking in the country?
- Recent research suggests that those who have attained a good understanding of Islam are less likely to be radicalised. The route to militancy is predominantly via economic, political or

personal grievances and once having become a militant they are then indoctrinated to a radical Islamic ideology

What has worked well in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- Public mobilisation campaign and sensitisation of stakeholders
- Community consultation on building projects, eyes and ears of formal police - how do you guarantee their protection in their cooperation?
- Was the IDP "returns process" really that successful? What were the people "returning to"?

INTERNATIONAL

- No inputs

What could have been done better in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- Public support / perception management - upward task getting tribes on board, which are critical to success
- Political negotiations
- Greater attention to psychological mindset
- Role of ISI?
- Special support to foot soldiers
- Lead time for deploying civilians when military strategy is developed
- Insufficient protection to witnesses and judges

INTERNATIONAL

- Is the utility of drones worth it? Is military effectiveness worthwhile or counterproductive? co
- Less interventionist approach, that doesn't undermine GoP credibility - keep low profile
- Negotiated settlement in Afghanistan which is acceptable to all major stakeholders
- Awareness of local cultural sensitivities
- Management of IDP crisis
- More people-centric approach - socio-development activities
- Reconsider conditional aid strategy
- Condition linked aid - it is absolutely necessary that economic and military aid are linked to conditions and benchmarks. The current state of the problem in Afghanistan is largely due to the unaccountable aid and weapons that were provided to Pakistan by the US as part of its strategy to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Unconditional support - aid or loan - will only encourage development of unaccountable and authoritarian state institutions which do not auger well for stability and progress in the country, and the region
- Must be cautious in linking aid to conditions. Beware the donor-country's (uninformed) political dynamics overwhelming the experts as drivers of the conditions. our politics are not necessarily more virtuous than theirs. choosing the recipients and managers of aid is a good complementary approach. Aiding a government provides better opportunity for control than aiding a jihadi group in a cold-war era fight
- Adding to aid conditionality, there's evidence, recently from Afghanistan, that conditionality doesn't work. It's not an incentive for recipients to act
- Technical cooperation is important to help local population to develop their own capabilities. As soon as local population sense the benefits of peace, they will disengage insurgency
- How do you pay for these interventions during an economic meltdown?
- More creativity - Friends of Pakistan to think more outside the box ...
- Deal with radicalisation in the West - link intervention support to domestic programmes in UK etc
- Accountability in aid needs to be established not only at the end of the recipient country, but also the donor

PHILIPPINES

- Would it not be right then to call this insurgency a resistance movement for the right of self determination?
- When the reasons for public support for the insurgency are genuine, how do you manage this movement? Would it not be prudent to grant them greater autonomy to keep them within the fold of one nation?
- When you bring in the international observers for independent monitoring don't you give legitimacy to the insurgency and cede the state authority?
- Are the people of the Philippines more pragmatic than other peoples? Is that part of the Philippine narrative?
- Just wondering if this experience in the Philippines could be used in DR Congo
- Can you speak to Philippine/U.S. advisory support relationship?
- If the three elements of statecraft are UNDERSTANDING, POWER and INFLUENCE, development can be harnessed to achieve influence. It is, however, only one tool in the box and not statecraft in its own right
- Interesting proposition: contested development. Why shouldn't insurgents contest the developmental area? Isn't their aspiration to create an alternative state infra to established government? It's just a function of government. Hezbollah do it. The IRA tried. All insurgents provide alternate justice...
- When the security situation in the troubled area is still being contested among the adversaries, do 'developmental projects' remain attractive targets for the militant groups?
- Development is a tool, that's why capacity building should be used in parallel as another statecraft tool
- The 3D strategy inevitably leads to competition for policy supremacy, which of course broadens and deepens the associated funding streams. The focus is inputs (funding, power through political support) rather than outputs or outcomes
- Except that 3D efforts can also include joint-decision making. Differences among mandates and interests exist between the ministries, but they don't have to be insurmountable. There are examples of good interdepartmental cooperation
- If the time is not ripe for nation building because of the complex geo-political environment and economic hardships, is there any hope of addressing the economic causes providing fillip to insurgencies around the world?
- The issue of how the international community approaches state building/nation building in countries where there is no concept or desire for a strong state is extremely problematic. How do we elevate the importance of supporting the development of culturally appropriate organic institutions in partnership with the host nation (whether they be public, private, civil society) with own governments over and above the drive from the international community to deliver centralised democracy and free market economics models that reflect our own states?
- In fact there is no recipe for state building. Each case has its own elements and local characteristics. State building should be implemented with local authorities and population and in a manner that new built institutions reflect local expectations and customs
- This is of course ideal but it ignores the political considerations and imperatives that drive western aid delivery and international intervention. It is also ignores the underlying mythology that stresses that some form of democracy and free market economics are believed to be key to the development of stable countries

What has worked well in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- Interesting to note the Philippines Govt is looking at the insurgency/conflict as a process of change, rather than a challenge to state sovereignty. Which is probably why political negotiations form the bedrock of their COIN
- "Joint Action Group" - Govt and MLF coordination
- Protection of civilians as a shared responsibility

INTERNATIONAL

- Act within legal limits and comfort zone of host nation and community: joint military training, no foreign military operations
- Ensure military presence provides visible benefit to local population
- Act in concert with host government

What could have been done better in the approach to internal conflict?**HOST**

- Deal with population growth
- Capacity building for local population to better use their agriculture assets

INTERNATIONAL

- Need to engage with private sector, which is much more impactful than the public sector - requires reversal of recent donor principles/approaches that aim to work predominantly through the state

NIGERIA

- What Innocent says about amnesty schemes in Nigeria is similar to what occurs in India, where a single murder will send you to jail or the hangman's noose, but hundreds of killings will bring you to the negotiating table with the state and provide privileged access to state institutions and the democratic system. Such schemes also undermine the power of lawful political organisations, which find it impossible to compete with the 'formerly' violent groupings. Such surrendered groups ordinarily retain significant proportions of their armed factions, and use a combination of intimidation and inducement to hijack the election process
- The UK's equivalent is a former terrorist organisation led by elected politicians who do not take their seats in Parliament but claim their expenses and whose communities take government subsidies
- Experience of such amnesty has mostly been counterproductive as on one hand it gave a moral high ground to the insurgents and on the other they are able to utilise it for rest, recuperating and rearming their ranks. An enduring and sustainable peace will only follow when the root causes are also addressed simultaneously
- There is a balance here. What you say is true as such, on the other hand, a big insurgency supported by their population is very difficult to defeat militarily unless you can separate them from their people. So, if we can't separate them from their people, even if we get military gains, the insurgents will reemerge, thus negotiation will be required. Associated with military threat, and some positive response to legitimate demands by the insurgents, we may reach a deal to having amnesty for the insurgent with the exception with those who have blood on their hands (with legal evidence)
- Was there a down side of a Nigerian solution to a Nigerian problem?
- Are there transferable lessons learned for international and independent state actors from your experience of donor and/or bilateral exclusion from assistance?
- What no-strings, self administered aid would be useful? How do you prevent corruption in such a process?
- Simple. Using technical cooperation. This modality builds local capacities and fosters sustainable development.
- The distinction between patterns of development is crucial. Development is not a smooth unidirectional process that benefits everyone. Indeed, it is often a deeply disruptive process, which worsens living conditions of significant segments of the population. Several questions relating to development in this context need to be addressed. At what stage is development an appropriate intervention? What pattern of development is appropriate? Who are the agents of development? What projects and what scale of projects are desirable? Among others
- Technical cooperation still brings in outside actors, maintaining those ties to someone else's agenda

- Technical assistance to corrupt actors can make them more effective at extracting rents from the population. This can be counterproductive to say the least. Aid should be directed to actors who have the political will to change.
- It brings outside actors, but the agenda should be determined by local authorities in conjunction with local population. This is not an easy task in fact since outside actors can just reject local plans. However, this is one of few possibilities to advance in the subject. Donors must understand that there is a limit to foreign aid and it is determined by locals.
- Rightly said that unless root causes are eradicated the militancy can re occur, but if some of those causes are due to external linkages then the world must get together to address them

What could have been done better in the approach to internal conflict?

HOST

- No inputs

INTERNATIONAL

- Avoid pressuring the elected government into negotiations with illegally armed groups for foreign interests - especially before the government is prepared

LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES SESSION 7

CAPACITY GAPS

COLOMBIA

- Civilian strategic/institutional leadership/oversight of security forces
- Officers in tactical military units

PAKISTAN

- Border management system
- Lack of technology to gain real time actionable intelligence and "precision" targeting
- Technology does not provide all the most important intelligence sources which are human; it provides better processes, databases and targeting to strike. These are no substitute for HUMINT and cultural understanding. I would rather have the latter than the former and the latter is essential for COIN, technology is not essential.
- Maintaining right level of boots on the ground
- Administrative and judicial capacity
- Law enforcement agents' ability to prosecute terrorist activities across the country (civilian)

PHILIPPINES

- In dealing with the 'ideological' issues with radical 'version/s' of Islam... may be a conference/brainstorming session could be done with like minded 'good' imams and intellectuals...and an action plan to deal with this globally could be drafted!

KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

- Patterns of use of force and efficacy of use of force
- Do we need to split things into two? i.e. the host government approach (India, Sri Lanka) as opposed to the multinational forces 'western model' approach (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia etc). What can we learn from this?
- We are talking a lot about COIN, but very little mention of stabilising the peace and peacebuilding. These are key counterparts to COIN, surely?
- Problem of defining "victory" from a whole-of-government perspective
- Problem of defining "success" from the host nation's perspective
- Some definitional issues need clarity - how to differentiate between insurgency and legitimate resistance, between insurgency and freedom fight
- Right of self-determination is the criterion to differentiate between insurgency and legitimate resistance
- How do you define "good enough"? Good enough to be able to operate competently as a professional force in their own environment, or good enough by western standards? I would suggest the former
- "Good enough" is a low bar and needs to be held there, not allowing for expectation creep, otherwise it costs in time and treasury
- It is very important to have metrics - the problem is really determining what and how to measure. And what those metrics are really telling you once you get wedded to a particular data stream
- Strategy must drive selection of metrics, so they can help us evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of the strategy and implementation and enable learning & adaptation
- As Susan points out in a comment connected to what Sergio said about the word "counter-insurgency" - Armed groups (short of war) pirates, drug cartels, warlords, militias, are probably better identified as an armed group rather than an insurgency. This is a new area of study
- How important is it to reconcile the two different perspectives – 'moral' and 'expedient' approaches? Principles versus pragmatism

- Is there an underlying 'evangelicalization' element in international COIN ops...parallel to security and development...?
- Do you include combating government corruption in countering the illegal economy?
- All negotiations with insurgents allow them to reconstitute and re-arm; WHERE HAS THIS NOT HAPPENED?
- The problem with metrics is that most of the outcomes take time before they manifest, before you can measure. There are time lags involved. Metrics also presume that there is a direct relationship between inputs and outputs. There are clear limits to applying one's experience in the medical field to working in a conflict zone
- What is the implication for any state that essentially cannot control its own borders? Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, U.S., Iraq
- There's been much talk about bilateral aid, but what about multi-lateral aid? Someone mentioned PCNAs for Pakistan for instance. Other potential venues are the UN Peacebuilding Commission or the Global Rule of Law Program at UNDP. Would these kinds of engagements lend more credibility to engagements than say largely single donor investments?
- The implications of spillover from the country where COIN is being undertaken. A successful COIN in Colombia has had negative fallouts for its regional neighbours who have not been well equipped to handle the problem. A challenging COIN operation in Afghanistan has had a negative fallout in Pakistan and vice versa. How do we undertake COIN in one country is isolation? And how do we strategise for arresting/managing regional spillovers?
- It is very difficult to ACHIEVE BORDER control by one country alone. You need to have an agreement with the other country and set the right mechanism for the control and communication on the level of the border guards and maybe higher levels of intel
- Border control to avoid spillover is an essential tool, but it needs to be done jointly by both countries. In some cases, it is necessary to work together with more countries or international organizations. Controlling borders alone leads to soften the problems effects, not solving them
- The rise of political Islam will be a contributing factor in radicalising populations across the globe. How can this be arrested without alienating communities of particular faith systems?
- There is an increasing trend of radicalisation - not only in the context of religion, but along regional and ethnic lines. Conflict prevention measures must take into consideration these radicalisation processes
- There appears to be an overlap between organised criminal groups and insurgent groups across all the case studies discussed today. Since COIN operations often get mired in controversies relating to political patronage and addressing root causes, is it possible to start focusing on tackling organised criminal activity, thereby breaking a very crucial link between these two groups?

REVIEW OF KEY THEMES AND IDEAS FOR BREAK OUT GROUPS

1. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

- Question is rather "who" is doing the development? Issue of local legitimacy
- It is very important to have metrics - the problem is really determining what and how to measure. And what those metrics are really telling you once you get wedded to a particular data stream
- Strategy must drive selection of metrics, so they can help us evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of the strategy and implementation and enable learning & adaptation
- how to ensure security in order to promote development and address some of the underlying causes that contribute to conflict?
- If we consider that development alone will provide us sustainable stability we are sadly mistaken. However, if we ignore development at all then your presence in the area is further challenged
- How to attain a proper understanding of the security-development-governance nexus in the specific context.
- How do we balance the respective roles of the police and army in a COIN environment?

- To the extent possible, the international donors need to get local regional blocs, organisations, and regional countries involved in the process. This will help in bridging the gap between Western concepts of governance which the donors are trying to implement, and local governance structures that are deeply rooted within the system
- Need to align ways and means with realistic, attainable, and modest ends.
- How to bring about coordination between different agencies within a country, and also coordination between various external actors/donors working on security, justice and development issues in a third country?
- The problem with using the military outside its role is not that they don't like it, the problems are that (1) it steals both opportunity and ownership from the local government and citizens and (2) the tool we use is not fit-for-purpose, and so is usually much less effective
- International Community needs to be more modest in its expectations of what can be achieved but capable of responding quickly when the problem becomes clear. Nothing can be achieved without emerging political will and the process to respond.
- Who sets priorities? Who really decides what gets done first? What is the process? Are there any examples in the world where the international force is in harmony with the host government on how to deal with the insurgency, the amount of force, the required supporting and facilitating actions, the "end state"? Or are priorities in the 'western' approach doomed to failure as they are rooted in alien priorities?
- Governance is a central issue that also needs to be debated here. Both the legitimacy and capacity of the affected government and the role of the international community in building governance capacity at all levels and supporting the affected government(s) to reconnect with the community.
- Problem of defining "victory" from a whole-of-government perspective
- Is there an underlying 'evangelicalization' element in international COIN ops...parallel to security and development...?
- Afghan proverb - "do not plant a tree in another man's garden". Development itself is not wrong (or at least hardly ever) - it is how you do it
- The problem with metrics is that most of the outcomes take time before they manifest, before you can measure. There are time lags involved. Metrics also presume that there is a direct relationship between inputs and outputs. There are clear limits to applying one's experience in the medical field to working in a conflict zone
- The West has developed rules of thumb about the mass of security forces compared to the local population required to protect a population and combat an insurgency. Does the experience of counter-insurgencies where the international community has played a minor role affirm these estimates or challenge them?
- The extraordinary variation in the quality of personnel who work in conflict-affected and fragile states overwhelms our counterparts and reduces their confidence and ability to identify what is useful advice, and what is useless, and a waste of money and time
- Complex problems (crises) perpetually change, our structures must be adaptive, not fixed (a form of: plans are worthless, but planning is everything)
- How can you get a shared analysis within government, so have a road map that can provide unity of effort across government in support of a shared agenda?
- Importance of understanding the appropriate use of force and the complimentary development of human security, food security, suitable locally supported government structures appropriate to the culture, customs, local economy - even if we don't empathize with the latter
- Setting mechanisms for coordination between intelligence and investigation services: investigators having access to database of intelligence services and intelligence services briefed on developments in an investigation and tasked to provide tactical support.
- Development, especially in terms of education and economic opportunities, always works - in the long term
- Does "development" work? Yes, in some cases. No, in some cases. Doesn't matter, in some cases. The fault is theorizing and trying to find a general rule. Every insurgency is unique, complex and fluid. The key is to find the factors when it worked, when it didn't, and when it didn't matter. In fact, labelling a situation as an "insurgency" does not help
- Patterns of use of force and efficacy of use of force
- The structure for COIN needs to be as multi-dimensional as the insurgency itself is... involving both security and development sectors

- Need to get incentives right at all levels from political level to the field in order to work toward a common strategic goal versus parochial individual or organizational goals.
- Reducing the trust deficient when working with coalition partners. Coalition partners need to work more effectively to build trust relationships with partners and the population.
- Graeme raised the point that whilst we collect lessons we seldom learn them or change the way we do business because of them. Insurgent groups on the other hand tend to be learning organizations and are often far more flexible, adaptive and imaginative than large bureaucracies. Improving the capacity of government institutions to learn and adapt is crucial in addressing the multi-dimensional conflicts we will continue to face into the future.
- "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature"-- Clausewitz [in these complex conflicts that statement is equally and interconnectively true for politics, development]
- Duty of care - civilians prevented from participating in same ways as military personnel
- UN missions need adequately staffed Public Information and Civil Affairs units. And these units have to work in a two-way street. They have to listen to the local population as well. Understanding local necessities and expectations helps a successful mission
- It important to unify understanding of mission. Development is defined differently by various agencies, as is engagement practices and capacities
- Bearing in mind the importance of UN missions (Sudan!), is a major consideration the building of appropriate doctrine, approach, capacity of the UN? Internal evaluation by the UN itself has admitted they just keep getting it wrong. In some countries do we just ignore them?
- How can government deal with networks of malignant actors?
- PSC are part of the future or are they - I believe they are
- Two points: On Haiti, the earthquake response effort was far from a failure. It was the largest and most successful international search and rescue effort in history saving 136 lives and the largest urban feeding program ever feeding more than 3 million people in record time, which avoided serious conflict. Unfortunately the media focused more on the real horror of the earthquake rather than the successes. Second point is on roles. It is critical that civilian institutions are given the resources to lead or the military will continue to be forced to play a de facto leadership role when it's development and diplomacy that needs to lead
- There appears to be a overlap between organised criminal groups and insurgent groups across all the case studies discussed today. Since COIN operations often get mired in controversies relating to political patronage and addressing root causes, is it possible to start focusing on tackling organised criminal activity, thereby breaking a very crucial link between these two groups?
- <<< How do we deal with our own side's political pressures? >>>
- "if you plan for it to be short, it will be long"
- All the case studies raised common considerations for addressing insurgency - governance, access to justice, need for behavioural change, importance of strategic communications and community consultation, capacity of institutions, strong leadership, overarching strategy, the need for international actors to be the silent partner, importance of reconciliation processes that provide development and reconnect the government with the population and tailored use of force. All these factors are interdependent. How do we coordinate and effectively deliver on all these requirements?
- Managing expectations is downstream; where the challenge lies is in visualising the expectation (worst, probable and best case) before the decision is made to commit to a coalition or deployment - the reasons and modelling that did not take place before the decision to Nation Build Afghanistan was taken are a good example of lazy political decision-making
- Dealing with our domestic political pressures is complicated because every message can reach many, diverse, even opposed audiences: how do we create and deliver "precision-guided messages"?
- <<< International involvement: What is the division of labour? >>>
- <<< How to structure COIN? >>>
- It is bigger than networks; what is emerging are assemblies of like-minded but unconnected trans-national groups and individuals - there are no linkages which makes intelligence exploitation extremely difficult

- Are the traditional silos in the west viewing Afghanistan and Iraq as unique and never going to recur? Are they expecting to return to "normality" without there being any such future engagement which creates the burning platform to challenge the siloed approach?
- <<< Does Development work? >>>
- Could it be less development per se than the distribution or dynamics of development that influence - reduce or decrease - conflict? It might be interesting to investigate why some of the richest areas in Afghanistan are among the most insecure while some of the poorest are among the most secure
- Is it the type that is deliberately targeting causes of insurgency?
- Concepts like COIN and the three Ds have been predominately developed by militaries and to a lesser extent diplomatic actors. Do we need new concepts that are developed in collaboration with all government actors
- Could the international community facilitate the establishment of an ongoing forum that brings together developing countries who have been working to combat insurgency within their own countries to share lessons and strategies?

2. SECURITY-JUSTICE

- Does development work is too broad an issue. Progress can be made towards the Millennium Development Goals without progress on conflict reduction. The issue is how can development reduce conflict and promote peace
- If development is unimportant why do insurgents compete for governance using development too; populations demand self-interested benefits from either just or unjust governance
- Many countries are building their capacity to deploy civilian experts overseas, as part of a whole-of-government strategy, to address complex emergencies. Why? Development experts have a greater understanding of how to deliver best practice development initiatives that may actually work, police personnel have a much greater capacity to train police forces in civil policing, civil service officers will be more effective in building effective governance mechanisms. What should the focus of the military be? Delivering security and creating space for civilian experts to come in and deliver that expertise in support of the affected host nation. It is worth noting that government civilians are often prepared to accept a greater level of security risk than military personnel give them credit for, and that when we talk about timelines in places like Afghanistan, we are only talking about the timelines for the withdrawal of military forces. Civilians - government and non-government - are there for the long term
- Balancing capability/operational effectiveness with accountability/legitimacy
- We're not structured to get police advisors on the ground, let alone justice advisors - even though we know we need more civilian inputs
- Security and Defence are becoming indivisible but progress in this 21st Century problem is held apart by the very Institutions of State who deliver these services the upcoming SDR will fail to address this
- Safety cannot be achieved without development. And development can only be sustainable with security.
- Can Colombian approach of embedding justice capability within military units to work in insecure areas be used in other conflict areas?
- Need for robust judicial system which in itself will provide confidence in the rule of law and their security environment
- What development are we talking about? Is it the type defined by the west and imposed on local communities?
- How do we balance the respective roles of the police and army in a COIN environment?
- Criminals and their organisations are reconcilable if the alternative is catastrophic failure
- The military is too powerful - the staff support overwhelms other Government Departments who go silent when they should not
- What is the best way to stand up security forces from an advise and assist role? Small numbers of advisors trainers like Philippines or large units like Iraq/Afghanistan? What if the host nation is not ready to assume some level of basic security for the country?
- How to mitigate the sharing of intelligence before security forces are fully formed and many times infiltrated with insurgent actors?
- How to protect judicial actors to prevent them from being intimidated from insurgents?

- How to produce due process procedures before you have enough judges and adequate lawyers etc. Otherwise there are great injustices leaving people in jail without recourse to a justice process.
- If development works, why is Haiti a failure? Many countries have tried a variety of approaches, with Haitian support, yet despite hundreds of millions of dollars and best intentions, decades of approaches, we haven't found an answer, even accounting for corruption and political will. Should we retreat from the field?
- Should the world be so concerned about excessive use of force or extra-judicial activity that occurs when countries counter internal terrorist organisations that do not have any concern for legal or justice systems or does excessive use of force result in significant unintended consequences?
- Broad base the engagement of community and security forces by involving the stakeholders - justice and security is beyond just the security and justice actors
- Haiti is not a failure. It had been a success case before the earthquake. It is an example of development used wisely to help Haitians to build their own country. However, the quake showed that the international community was not ready to respond as fast as we thought
- What about the "stooge factor"? Do we need to suspend our egos and contribute sufficiently to a corrupt society we know is victimizing us to see some scintilla of progress? What does our message become?
- what role do traditional/informal security and justice apparatus play in providing security and justice, and how can the state engage with them positively to providing an equitable security and justice environment
- I think patterns of use of force and efficacy of use of force should also be a key theme
- USF in Afghanistan considering changing the RoE (air strikes) - positive step. Although this kind of calibrated approach will take time
- Are there any general lessons to be drawn from the balance of effort between security (police and military - and where is the balance between these forces?) and justice development? Does the balance change as the campaign develops?
- Institutional capacity is more than advising. It entails developing the systems and processes as well as the institutional leadership and governance needed to sustain capabilities.
- The legitimacy and representative nature of the government is as important as the legitimacy of the military intervention
- What are the challenges of engaging with a security system which has been pivotal in regime stabilization or involved in human rights violations? And how to engage it to become more balanced and equitable in providing security
- Reform requires a positive incentive for political elites to change. How can donors and local populations create those incentives? How can we identify and strengthen the change agents?

3. RECONCILIATION


- From the case studies, are there general principles or conditions that can be identified for effective reconciliation and reintegration?
- If local knowledge is key to understanding insurgency, criminal activities and legitimate local grievances, how can we fairly ask the military to address and resolve these issues in affected areas? How can you keep local actors safe?
- The need for truth commissions and the role they can play towards reconciliation and reintegration
- Is dialogue between protagonists/antagonists always worthwhile? What are the risks involved of early engagement?
- Should the IC engage in reconciliation or should it always be through the host nation government?
- Development is a key issue in order to share peace dividends with the local population and avoid insurgency. For this, local population has to participate in the construction of its own future and realize insurgency is not worthy.
- What are the circumstances when the IC should engage with antagonists, separate from Host nation efforts?
- Reconciliation should consist of acknowledgement of grievances of diverse communities and ensure it addresses root causes of the conflict and is inclusive.

- what are the opportunities that the process of reconciliation provide to bring together the polarised communities in dialogue/discussion
- Dangers of perverse incentives during transitional justice processes - rewarding violence
- Reconciliation includes truth telling and ending impunity of both state and non-state actors.
- What parameters surround engagement with protagonists? Do these match parameters for a internal reconciliation process?
- Restorative vs punitive justice - different cultural traditions, e.g. pashtunwali is restorative/compensatory in nature not punitive. Tensions between these two.
- Should dialogue and counter insurgency action continue side by side? Does one need to occur before the other?
- Local reconciliation vs national reconciliation - e.g., pressure on national level deadlocks from local reconciliation.
- what are the changes/amendments that would be required in state structures/legislations to make the peace process durable and effective
- Picking the optimum time for reconciliation, especially for amnesties. Selecting the wrong time can be counterproductive.
- Is it possible to have reconciliation without reintegration?
- Are we rewarding people for the wrong behaviors?
- What crimes should be covered by the amnesty? war crimes? crimes against humanity? violent crime?
- Dialogue from a position of strength - a misconception?
- From the case studies, what is the value in removing high value targets (insurgent leadership)? Are there any other levers that should be developed to apply pressure on insurgent leadership to bring them back into the political process?
- Need to address the issue of arms sales
- Reconciliation shouldn't be bound by timeframes.
- What is the relationship between the military strategy and political reconciliation process?
- What is the role of regional powers in creating the conditions for reconciliation?
- Need to address legitimate local grievances and provide sense of justice. How can we deal with war crimes in a way that promotes reconciliation without creating impunity?
- If development were unimportant then insurgents wouldn't compete for governance and development
- Who should be reconciled and who should not? Should the worst offenders be required to serve sentences for capital offences?
- Should we differentiate between crimes committed against the state and crimes committed against the individual as a criterion for reconciliation?
- Deradicalisation as part of the reconciliation process

THEMATIC ISSUES IN WORKING GROUPS SESSIONS 8-11

SUMMARY

It was suggested that each working group follow the same process to structure their discussions. This allowed for the outputs to be tabulated as follows, based on the supporting transcripts below.



A simplified version of the teamwin journey metaphor used to structure and monitor strategic planning and implementation
teamwin mobilisation methodology © beechwood international ltd

1 OPERATIONAL COORDINATION	2 SECURITY-JUSTICE	3 RECONCILIATION
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CURRENT STATE: *What does it look like today?*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverse - often competing - objectives among international actors involved • Host government juggling concurrent interaction with many actors • Problems in one/more sector: governance, security, justice, social, economic • Misunderstanding of local realities: all interventions are undertaken in the cultural, historical and social context of the host country; donors realise they have a problem with this • Lack of common assessments re the nature of the state's fragility and insurgency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of cohesion between security and justice elements leads to blurring of roles and duplication of systems • Lack of training, equipment and special powers appropriate to fight insurgency • Propensity for corruption exacerbated by money available in illicit/militarised economies • Recognised importance of alternative dispute resolution, and need to build into formal system • Understanding of need for speed, efficiency • People's perception through media is that insurgents are the problem 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different current states, definitions, conflicts • Viewed as subordinate to other objectives, although perception may be shifting • War on terror language reducing importance and distorting the concept of reconciliation • Reconciliation is the legitimacy of a new order
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FUTURE STATE: *What is the longer term vision?*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A consolidated, secure and stable representative state, at peace with its neighbours • A common vision and plan shared by both the Host Country and Donor community • Donors are the silent partner; focus is on strengthening host capacity and ensuring that the host is always in the lead, always the public face • Enhanced credibility of the international community and trust in Host-Donor relationship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restored writ of government • A justice system that reflects the reality of the states they operate in, and security for all • Carefully calibrated use of force • Strengthened system in insurgency areas, with good human intelligence • Minimise enforcement gap when police is overwhelmed, dev strategy for transfer to SF • Appropriate role for military in peacetime • Integrated justice complex • Specialist capabilities that enhance coordination; avoid duplication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Root causes of conflict are addressed through a political rather than a military solution
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What can be achieved in the shorter term (e.g. 3 years)?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activity-based cooperation among international actors and host government • Common vision and coordination requires ongoing negotiation as the situation changes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional capacity-building in detention and prison management; improved conviction management • Incentives for improved policing; divert resources from development to policing where insurgency is disrupting dev • Local stake in policing • Affordable alternative to justice systems that even 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing conflicts are more likely to be settled through political processes
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	<p>effective democracies cannot sustain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local ownership of justice system, building on localised, traditional ways of dealing with insurgency • Linking formal and informal justice systems by documenting and registering informal outcomes, reducing burden on courts 	
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PRIORITIES: *What are the key obstacles to overcome?*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply-driven assistance from donors • Limited host government (Failing state) capacity to lead international effort or manage assistance • Paralysis-by-analysis: devoting more effort to assessing than to acting. Analysis must be a process of negotiation and relationship building • Internationally lacking non-military capabilities within the security sector: deployable interior ministry advisors, police, experts in justice, penal, legislative and judicial fields 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional resistance to reform/change • Stakeholder interest in increasing conflict • Absence of routines for coordination • Coordination challenges exacerbated by conflict • Establishing proper role of the military • Imposition of expensive, inappropriate systems • Donor cycles too quick 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic communications • Structural/legal constraints • Perception and timing • Demand for dignity/cultural sensitivity • National/regional/international approaches
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: *What are some potential solutions?*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building capacity to move failing states forward through "fragile status" and eventually to become stable states • Collaborating on assessments where conditions favour it, but at least sharing individual assessments • Economic development – utilise existing, tried-and-tested planning methods with appropriate inclusive planning processes • Education and training support to civil leaders • Ideally an agreed vision with the host government • Joint coordinating bodies (collaborative international, institutional, strategic, operational, tactical) • Recognised legal framework for intervention/assistance, including how to manage NGO assistance • Re-connecting elements of civil society with each other and with government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure financial independence of judicial systems through a constitutional arrangement. Will not, however, solve inevitable political fight over resources/who heads up justice system in conflict etc • Rebalance resource allocation from external (army) to domestic (police) security system • Accountability systems that help security and justice sectors keep each other to account • Donor assistance in form of equipment, rather than money, to reduce corruption • Involve region to address capacity gaps • Horizontally integrated plan that does not just "train and equip" one sector • Use procurement systems operational in-country to foster local competition 	<p><i>Strategic communications</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communicate effectively legitimacy of the peace process • Communications are substantial and transparent • Engage media more effectively, i.e. provide skills training for state actors <i>and</i> journalists • Messaging should underscore the primacy of a political, negotiated solution <p><i>Structural/legal constraints</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power sharing arrangements: flexibility to amend constitution; other legal frameworks • Build reconciliation into military and civilian doctrine and training DDR: possibility of amnesty • Do not make redlines explicit • Make conditions for entering discussions minimal • Do not peremptorily exclude parties from
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentives for long-term strategic partnership • Use holistic assessment as a basis to prioritise action and focus efforts. Considering broadly should not imply trying to address every aspect of the problem simultaneously 		<p>engagement and/or negotiations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examine system of land use rights and other grievances <p><i>Perceptions and timing</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep negotiations and communications channels open (look at civil society alternatives) • Reconciliation is a phased process • Use incentives to create conditions for a peace process • Recognise that there are different perspectives on the same facts among the opponents and even among third parties <p><i>Demand for dignity/cultural sensitivity</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires orientation and training of actors • Accept the legitimacy of the other side's needs, grievances • Recognise that groups are not monolithic e.g. Pakistan Taliban are not Afghan Taliban • Avoid labels that are not useful
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GROUP 1: TRANSCRIPT

Q1 CURRENT STATE

What does it look like today?

- Diverse - often competing - objectives among international actors involved
- Host government juggling concurrent interaction with a plethora of diverse actors
- Problems in one or more sectors: governance, security, justice, social, economic
- Misunderstanding of local realities: all interventions are undertaken in the context of cultural, historical and social understanding of the host country; donors realise they have a problem with this
- Lack of common assessments regarding the nature of the problem
 - clarify whether it is a failing or fragile state, i.e. one with strong state institutions, but that don't have full control over all their territory, or one where state institutions are very weak and need to be built
 - assess the nature of the insurgency, i.e. is it political, or is it really a transnational crime syndicate?

Q2 FUTURE STATE

What is the longer term vision?

- At highest level, a consolidated, secure and stable representative state, at peace with its neighbours
- A common vision and a common plan shared by both the Host Country and Donor community. Even if it is difficult to achieve it is extremely importance and worth the effort
- Donors are the silent partner; focus is on strengthening host government capacity and ensuring that the host government is always in the lead, always the public face
- This approach will enhance the credibility of the international community and strengthen trust with the host nation

What can be achieved in the shorter term?

- Activity-based cooperation among international actors and host government
- Common vision and coordination will more likely be achieved at the activity level and will require ongoing negotiation. Common vision needs to transform over time as the situation changes so it remains valid

Q3 PRIORITIES

What are the key obstacles to overcome?

- Supply-driven assistance from international actors
- Limited host government (Failing state) capacity to lead international effort or manage assistance
- Paralysis-by-analysis: devoting more effort to assessing than to acting. There will never be a systematic way to collaborate on the basis of assessments, rather it should be a process of negotiation and relationship building
- Internationally lacking non-military capabilities within the security sector: deployable interior ministry advisors, police, experts in justice, penal, legislative and judicial fields

Q4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

What are some potential solutions?

- Building capacity to move failing states forward through "fragile status" and eventually to become stable states
- Collaborating on assessments where conditions favour it, but at least sharing individual assessments
- Economic development – utilise existing, tried-and-tested planning methods with appropriate inclusive planning processes
- Education and training support to civil leaders
- Ideally an agreed vision with the host government
- Joint coordinating bodies (collaborative international, institutional, strategic, operational, tactical)
- Recognised legal framework for intervention/assistance, including how to manage NGO assistance
- Re-connecting elements of the civil society with each other and with government
- The incentive of a long-term strategic partnership – must be seen as a help, rather than millstone
- Use holistic assessment as a basis to prioritise action and focus efforts. Considering broadly should not imply trying to address every aspect of the problem simultaneously

Q5 CONCLUSIONS

What are the main conclusions from this session?

- Building local capacity for governance is cross-cutting/fundamental
- A shared understanding of Context is critical
- Basic principles include Constant Dialogue, Trust and Honesty

Q6 RECOMMENDATIONS

What are the key recommendations?

- To reconcile the two operating frameworks for donors and host nations, 5 'C's are proposed:
 - Common Vision (shared between the Donor and the Host – developing a partnership over time)
 - Cooperation (defining the rules and conditions for coordination and leadership)
 - Coordination (defining the mechanisms to bring the multiple agencies)
 - Credibility (resourcing and political will to deliver on agreed assistance over the long term)
 - Common lexicon (negotiated and agreed common language)

GROUP 2: TRANSCRIPT

Q1 CURRENT STATE

What does it look like today?

- What are the general characteristics of security and justice systems when conflict is underway? Two major challenges: quantity of cases and quality of cases. Three pieces police, military, justice. Under conflict start to pull apart. Military becomes too strong. Police two things paralysed because can't compete or militarised, justice loses its relevance. Can't operate because of security. No operation across country again because of security. Break between justice system and real situation on the ground
- Justice system seen to have consistently failed to deliver justice over time. If that goes hand in hand with military failing manifestly to protect the population, then this describes current state
- Cohesiveness govt and rule of law broken. Cohesiveness elements of system gone
- In judicial system police deal with evidence. During insurgency police work off intelligence... system needs to adapt
- Military building parallel justice system. In Colombia military justice is much more effective because not playing by rules. Judge will spend 2 years trying to resolve case. Then cannot implement solution. Military system of justice is fast and brutal but communities like the certainty and the product is better. Citizens remember this system and remember its effectiveness. Don't adapt well into effective systems
- Police trained for law and order, not trained for insurgency. Not equipped either. Military responds late so there is a gap in the middle. Political will if not there to confront a situation it will get worse because overlooked. Insurgency can get a grip then. For justice system, need to make laws compatible with insurgency – more compatible and conducive to prosecution than to insurgents. Special powers
- In cases where insurgents are powerful, lack of witnesses is a problem. Judges very technical, go by the book do, not go by the situation
- Features of justice systems in peace times become a problem. Justice system completely captured by military or terrorists. Witnesses are critical but won't come forward. Decentralised system becomes centralised need national bodies to deal with cases
- Corruption becomes a factor. Judges and police take bribes. Not peculiar to conflicts, may be exacerbated by amount of money available in illicit/militarised economies
- Strengths. Understanding of need for speed and efficiency. Community policing can help
- Understanding of importance of alternative dispute resolution, building it into formal system
- Perception of people through justice system media, that insurgents are the problem

Q2 FUTURE STATE

What is the longer term vision?

- What kind of security and justice systems give clear warning and help to end conflicts?
- As soon as law and order breaks down force is used and this may not help over the longer term. When the military is moved in, their first reaction is to use force which complicates the system further. Ideal is therefore not having the military react too fast
- At the same time effectiveness when you deliver justice is critical. Sometimes if prevent use of force, communities are looking for protection and may want a robust response. If in the city support police. But in community, people often love the army and do not trust the police. So although ideal is not to use military, people would prefer. So we need to put the three together. Need firepower of army to provide security; police cannot do it alone. Need justice system to provide rule of law, but they also need military protection
- Strengthened system in insurgency areas – needs good intelligence, police in the community who can access human intelligence. Preferably from community and operate as military eyes and ears in communities. In different areas we have had jails made. Detention centres for insurgents. Seat of govt has security provided by the army outside. Inside police manage detention, policing judges deliver justice

- Gap between when police is overwhelmed and in that gap paramilitary Special Forces arrive. Ideal situation should seek to minimise this gap and have a strategy for doing it
- In future we need a justice system that reflects the reality of the states they operate in. All actors need to play a role in another framework that operates to deliver security for all. Poor people rely on rural systems - and to deliver security this reality and what is used needs to be factored in
- Justice complex that contains intell, detention facilities and houses police intell judiciary all together
- Sometimes get a situation where everybody wants to do everything and this is chaotic. In time of conflict everyone competes. What is critical is a system of co-ordination. Otherwise different actors develop capabilities to do everything
- Army should not be involved with domestic security. This gets blurred during an insurgency. Army should leave and should be left out of internal political dimension
- This may depend on how you define ideal situation. Do you want army involved in COIN 20 years down the line?
- Conflict means part. security situation. Problems in normal times may be beyond normal police capabilities. Submarines carrying drugs in Colombia. Could equip the police, but that would be very expensive; should probably use the Navy. Otherwise expensive repeated capability
- Set of rules which enable military to manage particular situations i.e. submarines, but means that military stay in appropriate role
- Peacetime normally identified as time when military not involved in normal operations. But sometimes that does not work. So question is how to make that work?
- Another option is national police with special capability
- Our experience is that Army is very effective. Army has come in and cleared, but holding is a police admin job so we need them on the ground to take over. Police, local administration part of ensuring writ of government
- Strengthened police with equipment, sources of intell (community police) and strengthened local operation. Restored writ of government

What can be achieved in the shorter term?

- Enhancement of detention and better prison management
- Building reforming detention infrastructure. Training human capacity police judges improving conviction management. Human rights, use of force with more intelligence. Change of mindset from conflict/insurgency to peace administration
- Incentives for improved policing. More pay, more people
- Build local stake in policing that may mitigate final situation
- Average developing country – can it afford an effective justice system? Where are the resources going to come from to provide this? Even effective democracies find this difficult to afford. Why are we imposing on countries that can't afford this? If they can't, what is the effective alternative that is affordable?
- What would work? Donors need to ensure that initiative have local ownership
- Resource challenged countries – need more localised traditional ways of dealing with these issues. Informal system delivers: how can we support this system and draw in the non-state actors? This is a way out of donor dependent situations
- Diverted money from development into the police because insurgency was destroying development
- Lagos state government – citizens' mediation centre. If people reach agreement through negotiation can be registered as a judgement of the court. Linking formal and informal justice systems. Documenting and registering informal outcomes is a good way of mitigating conflicts. And will not wither away state will never have the writ in Africa
- Also happening effectively in Pakistan... disputes resolved and then registered in court. Reduces burden on the courts
- Some doubts about the use of traditional justice system... but need to understand that these systems are corrupt and how do you monitor human rights etc?
- Need to think how much you will focus on traditional and how much you will modernise
- Can have complementary local international and national systems

- Need to determine where legitimacy lies. Key to thinking about how can be drawn into the mainstream
- Informal can be important whilst the mainstream justice system lacks credibility
- Short term we can look at institutional capacity. Are the police getting paid or supplementing through rent seeking, and can we target that gap and fill it? Gives institution more resilience in stress of insurgency
- Border protection important in societies vulnerable to transnational crime

Q3 PRIORITIES

What are the key obstacles to overcome?

- Who is benefitting and how can we deal with them?
- Look at system and analyse how to get it working more effectively. Inter-agency crisis management
- Colombia, who does what?
- Absence of routines of coordination beforehand helps
- Reform and change often resisted by institutions
- Pakistan, committees which include officials, military, intell, police and co-ord and work out what needs to be done. Chaired by the governor. Sit down and thrash out issues. Army would even discuss operational plan. Huge success made a big difference
- Co-ordination should include state and non-state actors. Donor funded cycles too short for change processes before dismissing them as failures. Change within security and justice conservative institutions need longer cycles
- Think about the financing of changes. Peace, civil admin does not attract much money whereas military does
- Raising taxes from society mired in conflict is very difficult

Key obstacle summary

- Co-ordination very difficult, especially in conflict
- Some parties benefit from chaos, and will have a stake in increasing conflict, insecurity. Not confined to insurgents; some non-combatants make a lot of money out of conflict
- Military may get too much power and want to do everything, but is necessary, so figuring out proper role is an obstacle
- Reform and change often resisted by conservative institutions. Lack of rules of engagement for key state security and justice actors in conflict. Clear and standardised procedures and frameworks for emergency management
- Imposing expensive inappropriate systems
- Donor cycles are too quick

Q4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

What are some potential solutions?

- Strategic planning framework that integrates all the systems but also details governance, legal and regulatory framework
- Build in local ownership. Try and get away from dependency on international funding.
- Donors want to reform everything simultaneously. Country lead plans that all donors can sign up to
- Colombia integrated CIVMIL strategic plan, support followed the plan
- Also important to understand that you will not solve donor government tension. Human rights strict review system good in the long term; in the short term we have to assert sovereignty
- Funding will go to some units in Army and not to others, and this is an invasion of sovereignty rights. Donor perspective is that this is targeted assistance
- 3 critical areas for investment: 1) org management, accountability, respect for due process, appropriate position of security forces etc; 2) co-ordination; 3) mechanisms for informal system. Minimum five year donor cycles which allow things to change. 1-2 years to negotiate

assets; by the time this is done, programme is finished. Design of assistance should include national actors who understand changes and drivers of change

- Private sector actors, media, need to be built into design process as well
- Major US funding for sec and justice. US wants to give to NGOs to avoid government corruption. GoP if you give money to NGOs there will be credibility issues and democracy will not be developed. GoP develop list of NGOs with credible support base and US will fund them... negotiation, makes for better partnership. Donor countries have interests but so do recipient governments. These need to be reconciled somehow
- Judicial system paid by government and then almost become subordinate to government. Need to be independent and so funding needs to be managed through a constitutional arrangement that gives judiciary money in their own right
- Agree but if solving problems out of a conflict, cannot dismiss the inevitable political fight over resources and who heads up justice system etc. No way to divorce or seal things off completely. Will always be tied up especially in a conflict. Some time until it can be made more independent or equitable. Realistic about changes in power and understand that in chaotic environment with broken justice system
- Security system, in devp countries has two aspects. Domestic - police. External - army. Imbalance in allocation of resources. External security gets too much. Where there is an insurgency, governments need to think and allocate resources sensibly to domestic security
- Need to think about getting a balance between security sectors and justice sectors, but also get them to function in a more integrated way
- Appropriate balance and linkages between security and justice. Need to both work together and also hold each other to account
- Clear plan feeds into clear roles which can be used to assess and establish budgets. Major field problem is that institutions operate in silos; very few success stories of integration across agencies
- Pakistan – criminal justice co-ordination committee. In each district session judge chairs the committee. Police officer prosecutor also there and work out co-ordination
- Take judges and pull them from other provinces, integrating but not controlling each other or available for control by corrupt officials or the insurgency. Way of building in a degree of accountability
- Need to keep some level of budgetary security particularly within security apparatus. How do you protect part of the budget in security terms? Budget for long term reforms
- Aid has a role to play can be used to leverage long term planning, but has to be done with government
- Donors on security apparatus, issues about where money goes. Donors should follow govt assessment. Provide equipment directly, not money. Reduces corruption. Need assessments are evaluated and then materiel provided
- Gaps in capacity – how far can we get the region involved? International best practice. Might be a way of addressing capacity gaps. Sometimes assistance from beyond the region does not work. Western countries may impose concepts that are inappropriate, having regional engagement might help
- Traditionally US assistance has focused on “train and equip” and has failed to focus on institutions and governance within the security sector. T and E in Africa. Small boats focused on piracy. Successful mission in own terms. But pirates turned over to justice sector and pirates buying their way out. Need to look at the whole picture and not just in silos. Need a horizontally integrated plan
- Donors use procurement systems operational in country. Runs over sovereignty issues, national capacity issues. Need to run local competition

Q5 CONCLUSIONS

What are the main conclusions from this session?

- When the state is embroiled in insurgency or conflict, there is a significant presence of a parallel system of security and justice providers, which is quick and efficient, however brutal or unfair it may appear

- The government is seen to be competing with alternative security and justice providers, which appear to enjoy the legitimacy
- There may be value in co-opting the alternative dispute redressal agencies and mainstream them. This will not only augment the government's ability to offer quick security and justice service, but also bring these informal institutions into an apparatus that is accountable and transparent
- There is gap when police is overwhelmed by insurgency, and when the paramilitary or military actually comes in. There needs to be a coordinating strategy through which this gap is reduced and rules of engagement clearly established
- In a conflict environment, there are many agencies delivering similar functions, and there is overlap of services. There is therefore a need for clear coordinated structures which define roles and do not replicate capability unnecessarily
- There is a need for financial independence of the judiciary
- While there is merit to have focused intervention in particular sectors, a sector-wide engagement is preferred. This is to ensure that all sectors are evenly balanced, and one sector is not too developed than the other
- There is a need to redefine donor cycles. Maybe extend it to 5 years so that time is sufficient to germinate the objectives of the donor program
- There is a need to engage the spoilers, and ensure they do not upset the reform process
- Joint planning processes and procedures between host nation and donor

Q6 RECOMMENDATIONS

What are the key recommendations for the host?

HOST

- Broad base political ownership by involving a range of stakeholders
- To have a transparent process when engaging with the external donor, have clear objectives, have a balanced representation of various stakeholder viewpoints
- Minimum use of force, fire only when fired upon, engage in dialogue, avoid collateral damage
- Create an apex body that will coordinate at the highest level and prepare the grounds for change
- Develop legislative frameworks, operationalise it into rules of engagement, and internalise it through training
- A balance needs to be attained when developing a legislative framework that ensures security and guarantees to the people, and gives scope for the security and justice agencies to engage effectively
- Specific legislation may be required for the security and justice agencies to work under conflict situations
- Create consensus among the stakeholders for change, and make change look positive
- Find champions for change, change managers, and agents for change
- In the short term engage the alternative mechanisms of justice and security providers. In the long term try to mainstream them through institutionalisation of their services. They are effective and acceptable, make them accountable
- Customise reform doctrines within the cultural context
- Invest in a national strategic review, and operationalise it through a clear action plan with timelines and resource management
- For a short term change, work on a framework of engagement
- Before seeking external assistance, ensure you have a strategic plan in place
- Ensure reform process do not strain resources available for actual functioning of the security and justice sectors
- Have strategy driven reforms and not reform driven strategies
- A recurring challenge is when donors do not want to work with specific agencies or individuals in host countries because they are perceived as corrupt and incompetent. Leadership (donor and host) plays an important role in trying to find a common ground. There are no easy answers for this problem. But it helps to be aware of this challenge
- Determine roles and functions of local administration, police, and counterinsurgency forces (army, paramilitary) for effective functioning of the security sector

- Understand the value of debriefing sessions for lessons learned
- Ensure judiciary is engaged in the process of strategic planning and national security strategy
- There is a need to coordinate different agencies at the national and local level
- It is essential to have a forum to have a coordinating mechanism for justice and security agencies at the local level
- 3 critical areas for investment: 1) org management, accountability, respect for due process, appropriate position of security forces etc; 2) co-ordination; 3) mechanisms for informal system

What are the key recommendations for the donor?

DONOR

- Need baseline assessment of justice and security capacity conducted in partnership between donor and host government
- Need division of labour between host and donor; planning should be done on behalf of the host government
- Need to balance short term priorities / game changers versus long term
- Donors should design programs that tap local expertise that builds capacity with the donor focusing on specialized technical expertise
- M&E should be conducted with local people on teams and with the intent to build local M&E capacity as well as measure impact
- Need to balance need for accountability in plans and programs with need to be flexible and adaptive and adapt to growing local capacity to plan; need to allow for a process of local learning
- Need to balance "train and equip" investments with investments in ministerial systems and processes; need to build institutions
- Need comprehensive assessment and analysis; pick easy wins and prioritize in a limited number of key areas
- Donors can conduct their own assessment that includes input from local populations as well as governments when governments are not representative
- Donors should create incentives for formal and informal justice and security systems to coordinate with each other; bring them closer; identify what the informal system does well and try to incorporate it in formal system--may be best for donor not to deal with informal system at all
- Donors need to have surge capacity for building justice sectors (e.g. police training, judicial training)
- Need more formalized mechanisms to coordinate assistance between donors and governments; joint fora to conduct strategic planning and programming
- Donors should provide venues, fora, process for planning but host government should make the decisions
- Donors should design programs that create incentives for peaceful dispute resolution and reconciliation
- Donors should adapt 5-year planning processes that are sufficiently flexible and adaptive to adapt to changed situations
- Need to do more work on the relationship between state and non-state actors and their relationship with donors

GROUP 3: TRANSCRIPT

Q1 CURRENT STATE

What does it look like today?

- There are so many current states that it is difficult to characterise them
- At least two different definitions of reconciliation – as an ongoing process or as a post-conflict process
- Reconciliation has helped to end conflicts historically, but language of war on terror has diminished importance of reconciliation and distorted the concept
- Two types of internal conflict – state tries to use its power to end the conflict; conflict with international intervention
- Reconciliation is seen as subordinate to other objectives, although this may be shifting in perception
- General populace within a country desires peace, but there needs to be packaging for those outside
- Reconciliation means that there is legitimacy of a new order

Q2 FUTURE STATE

What is the longer term vision?

- Root causes of conflict are addressed through a political rather than a military solution

What can be achieved in the shorter term?

- Existing conflicts are more likely to be settled through political processes

Q3 PRIORITIES

What are the key obstacles to overcome?

Distillation

- Strategic communications
- Structural/legal constraints
- Perception and timing
- Demand for dignity/cultural sensitivity
- Goals: cessation of hostilities through to transitional justice
- National/regional/international approaches

Initial brainstorm

- Perception management
- Role of Media
- Type of internal conflict – compatibility with constitution of the country; external factors
- Demands of the conflict – maximalist; divisions within protagonists of the conflict
- Limited willingness of the majority to accept the demands of a minority – Philippine case
- Divisions within groups – in government and among insurgents
- Demand for parity with the state
- Demand for dignity
- Demand to limit demands
- What conditions and constraints are put on the process – what are the legal constraints; international conventions etc
- Perception that absolute victory is possible
- Regional dynamics – good international neighbourhoods versus bad neighbourhoods
- People's perceptions of the limits of reconciliation

- Challenge of when you can start a reconciliation process
- Challenge of what level of reconciliation is possible – obstacle is understanding what is possible
- Lack of confidence in the peace settlement – not responsive to what elements of society desire – driven by external or elite groups
- Unwillingness of states or non-state actors to restructure or of opposition to reconcile
- Reconciliation depends on the stakes on the table
- Channels for negotiation--public or 'back channel'
- Impatience for a solution
- Imposition from outside of an agreement not accepted by those involved in the conflict
- Definitions and assumptions of what reconciliation means
- Continued external support for one or both sides
- Impact of terrorist tag
- Moral constraints
- Peace settlements do not necessarily deliver reconciliation
- Reconciliation not seen as a viable option
- How a conflict ends determines in part the quality of reconciliation
- Lack of clear understanding of the other side
- Transitional justice issues
- Possibility that there are small fractions of a movement that do not accept a peace settlement; continue fighting

Q4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

What are some potential solutions?

- Build reconciliation into military and civilian doctrine and training
- Strategic communications
 - Communicate effectively legitimacy of the peace process
 - Communications are substantial and transparent
 - Engage the media in a more effective manner: means include providing media skills training for both state actors and journalists
 - Messaging should underscore the primacy of a political, negotiated solution
- Structural/legal constraints
 - Power sharing arrangements: flexibility to amend constitution; other legal frameworks
 - DDR: possibility of amnesty
 - Do not make redlines explicit
 - Make conditions for entering discussions minimal
 - Do not peremptorily exclude parties from engagement and/or negotiations
 - Corollary – it may be at some point factions of the opposing groups never want to negotiate
 - Examine the system of land use rights and other grievances
- Perceptions and timing
 - Keep negotiations and communications channels open
 - Look at alternative, civil society, channels for communications, reconciliations
 - There is no purely military solution
 - Reconciliation is a phased process
 - Use incentives to create conditions for a peace process
 - There is no best time for reconciliation
 - Recognise that there are different perspectives on the same facts among the opponents and even among third parties

- Demand for dignity/cultural sensitivity
 - Are we really not sensitive to peoples' dignity and culture? It is a requirement that we are responsive to these concerns. It is a serious matter. Requires orientation and training of actors. Understanding the culture is a constant for handling any situation
 - Is it possible to say we have to accept the legitimacy of the other side's needs, grievances? We do have to accept that they have legitimate grievances
 - Recognize that groups are not monolithic e.g. Pakistan Taliban are not Afghan Taliban
 - Avoid labels that are not useful – delegitimizing your opponent
- National/regional/international approaches
 - Neighbours have to be brought into the approach
 - Work at several levels – nations have to live long terms with the solutions; we need to give priority to national objectives
 - Third parties need to be prepared to facilitate rather than impose solutions
 - There is often the need for a referee – space should be kept for a carefully chosen neutral and/or mutually accepted facilitator/referee
 - A strong guarantor may be needed
 - Donors need a unified selfless approach
 - Local actors cannot appear to be puppets of international actors

Q5 CONCLUSIONS

What are the main conclusions from this session?

- Peace process is a necessary but not sufficient part of a process of reconciliation
- There is no purely military solution to these types of conflict
- Political process is an essential part of the solution
- Primacy of local (national) actors
- All parties need to engage in compromise
- Reconciliation can be a long time and a phased process
- Look for settlements that are short, interim and longer term
- There is no best time for reconciliation
- Approaches to reconciliation will look different in every country – in accordance with the characteristics of that country
- Assumptions about what reconciliation means can prevent a process even beginning
- Must understand which obstacles can be dealt with and which constitute underlying conditions that may affect settlement
- Reconciliation constitutes a positive rather than a negative
- Reconciliation must end the culture of impunity

Q6 RECOMMENDATIONS

What are the key recommendations?

- Communications strategy directed at a positive approach needs to be an integral part of a peace process
- Goals: from cessation of hostilities through to transitional justice
 - Prioritize national over international goals
 - Emphasize an end to violence. Get both sides to cease violence. Take into account local sensitivities e.g. use of Ramadan in Iraq as a pause in hostilities
 - Goals are likely to be achieved incrementally
 - The ultimate goal needs to be seen as transitional justice
 - The narratives of victims and survivors need to be heard and there ought to be an institutionalized truth telling
 - Identify the leadership with whom you choose to negotiate, bearing in mind that you need to ensure inclusivity. Ensure to deal with a leadership that is representative of the group you seek to negotiate with
 - Recognize that the end state will not be the status quo ante